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Abstract 
Various governments around the world have sought to pass legislation regulating 
electoral campaigns, in particular their financial aspects.  Electoral reform is high on 
the Australian Government’s agenda.  In a Green Paper published in December 2008, 
the Australian Government canvasses some possible reforms to Australia’s electoral 
system, most especially in the funding area.1  These proposals to some extent mirror 
developments elsewhere.  In this paper, I consider the specific suggestion that caps or 
bans should be placed on private funding of political parties.  This policy suggestion 
is considered primarily from a constitutional point of view in terms of its validity.  In 
so considering, comparisons will be made with other jurisdictions in which such 
reforms have been made, and political science issues pertinent to the discussion will 
also be considered.  Much can be learned from experiences in this regard overseas. 
 
Introduction 
Electoral legislation can take many forms.  One form is the requirement for disclosure 
of donations they receive.  I will not consider the question of disclosure of donations 
in detail in this paper, because I have no difficulty with, and see the benefit of, 
requiring political parties to publicly disclose funding donations they receive, 
including at relatively low levels.2  Nor will I take issue with the existing system by 
which some public funding is provided to political parties, although it is important to 
acknowledge in the discussion of issues in this article that this source of funding 
exists.3  I will focus in this paper on the suggestion that caps or bans should be placed 
on private funding or expenditure.4  Of course, private donations are just one means 
by which political parties derive revenue; they derive revenue from return on the 
investment of assets, membership dues, as well as funding from the public purse.5  
 
Outline of Green Paper Proposals 
While the Green Paper makes it clear that many issues need to be considered and that 
no final decisions on any possible reforms have been made, some of the argument in 
favour of the introduction of a cap or ban on private funding, or relatedly a cap on the 
amount of money that a candidate might spend on an electoral campaign, appear in 
the paper.  They are sufficiently important to warrant direct quoting: 
 
                                                 
1 Australian Government Electoral Reform Green Paper: Donations, Funding and Expenditure 
December 2008 (Green Paper). 
2 Further discussion of disclosure rules appears in K D Ewing ‘The Legal Regulation of Electoral 
Campaign Funding in Australia: A Preliminary Study’ (1992) 22 University of Western Australia Law 
Review 239. 
3 The system works by reimbursing parties a certain sum for each first preference vote cast in their 
favour, provided they gain at least 4% of those votes:  Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 s294, 297.  
This regime is discussed in more detail in Joo-Cheong Tham and David Grove ‘Public Funding and 
Expenditure Regulation of Australian Political Parties: Some Reflections’ (2004) 32 Federal Law 
Review 397, 405-415 and Graeme Orr ‘The Currency of Democracy: Campaign Finance Law in 
Australia’ (2003) 26 University of New South Wales Law Journal 1; Owen Fiss ‘Money and Politics’ 
(1997) 97 Columbia Law Review 2470. 
4 Until 1980, limits were imposed in Australia on the amount of campaign expenditure – a good history 
of electoral funding regulation in Australia appears in:  Deborah Cass and Sonia Burrows 
‘Commonwealth Regulation of Campaign Finance – Public Funding, Disclosure and Expenditure 
Limits’ (2000) 22 Sydney Law Review 477, 491. 
5 The Australian Government estimates that approximately 20% of the funding of the Labor Party and 
the Liberal Party is derived from the scheme by which the public funds parties based on their results at 
the last election:  Green Paper p12. 
Australia does not currently limit the amount individuals and organisations can contribute to political 
parties, candidates and others in the political process, on the basis that such support is a legitimate 
exercise of the right to freedom of political association and expression.  A criticism of that approach is 
that permitting donations of any amount .. risks making the recipients of the donations potentially 
dependent on a small number of large donors, vulnerable to possible undue influence or corruption …6 
Banning or capping private funding could assist in addressing concerns about the effectiveness of 
Australia’s federal public funding and financial disclosure scheme to achieve the aim of reducing 
political parties’ and candidates’ reliance on donations and other private sources of funding for 
contesting elections 7… Eliminating or reducing private funding with bans or caps would address 
concerns about undue influence.  It is argued that both bans and caps go towards ensuring that all 
citizens have equal opportunity to participate in the political process – either by reducing the level of 
permissible donations to that affordable by a larger number of people through a cap, or with a complete 
ban, by eliminating private funding altogether.  It is suggested that in such a situation, political 
participation and support for the political party of choice would then be limited for all to the level of 
volunteer involvement and party activism.8
 
The paper recognises that the effect of such regulation might be to broaden the 
membership base of parties.9  A critical issue would be the level at which the cap was 
set.10  Differential arrangements may apply depending on whether the donor is an 
individual or non-individual.11  It is possible some donors may seek to circumvent 
caps through indirect means.12
 
On the related question of the possibility of caps on electoral spending, the Green 
Paper again takes no concluded position, however it includes this comment: 
 
With or without matching caps on private donations, capping expenditure has the potential to minimise 
the ‘arms race’ between major parties in election campaigning.  By imposing an upper limit on election 
spending, the need for and advantages in attracting large donations and other financial support would 
be removed, and the incentive for any political party to chase dollars and potentially trade benefits or 
access for funding would be minimised.13
 
As the Green Paper specifically recognises, but does not resolve, suggestions of 
funding and/or expenditure caps raise possible constitutional difficulties in Australia, 
given the High Court of Australia’s findings of an implied freedom of political speech.  
I will now turn to this jurisprudence, and explore how other democracies have sought 
to reconcile such freedoms with a perceived need to regulate election finance. 
 
Part A: Campaign Finance Regulation and Freedom of Speech 
 
(a) Political Free Speech Cases in Australia14
                                                 






12 7.11.  The experience in other jurisdictions will be noted later in the paper. 
13 8.28. 
14 Commentary on these cases appears in several articles, for example Adrienne Stone ‘Rights, Personal 
Rights and Freedoms: The Nature of the Freedom of Political Communication Under the Australian 
Constitution’ (2001) 25 Melbourne University Law Review 374; ‘Freedom of Political Communication, 
the Constitution and the Common Law’ (1998) 26 Federal Law Review 219; James Stellios ‘Using 
Federalism to Protect Political Communication: Implications from Federal Representative 
Government’ (2007) 31 Melbourne University Law Review 239; Michael Coper ‘The High Court and 
Free Speech: Visions of Democracy or Delusions of Grandeur? (1994) 16 Sydney Law Review 185; 
 
 Australian Capital Television Pty Limited v Commonwealth; State of New South 
Wales v Commonwealth15(ACTV) 
Interestingly for present purposes, it was in the context of legislation purporting to 
limit spending on political advertising that the High Court of Australia recognised for 
the first time a constitutional freedom of political discussion in the ACTV case.  
There provisions of the Broadcasting Act 1942 (Cth) introduced by the Political 
Broadcasts and Political Disclosures Act 1991 (Cth) were challenged on 
constitutional grounds.  In effect, the provisions prohibited a government or non-
government body from political advertising during election periods, by prohibiting the 
broadcaster from broadcasting such advertising.  The Act also required broadcasters 
to make available free of charge units of time for election broadcasts to a political 
party, person or group (‘party’), based on the relative numerical strength of that party 
in the Parliament that had been dissolved when the election was called.  The Act was 
claimed by the relevant Minister to be necessary to ‘prevent potential corruption and 
undue influence of the political process’.  It was said the high cost of advertising 
meant that most people could not afford to pay for advertising.   
 
Five justices16 declared these provisions to be invalid on the basis that a citizen’s 
freedom to communicate on political matters, essential for representative democracy 
implicit in the Constitution, was unacceptably infringed by the provisions.  The 
majority judges saw the freedom as necessary for accountability of elected officials.  
It was necessary to allow criticism of public officials, to allow citizens to seek to 
bring about change, call for action and otherwise influence elected representatives.17  
In words particularly relevant for current purposes, Mason CJ was prepared to 
concede the possibility that the need to raise substantial funds to conduct an electoral 
campaign could lead to a risk of corruption and undue influence,18 so some regulation 
might be justified.  However, the Court should  
 
scrutinize very carefully any claim that freedom of communication must be restricted in order to 
protect the integrity of the political process.  Experience has demonstrated on so many occasions in the 
past that, although freedom of communication may have some detrimental consequences for society, 
the manifest benefits it brings to an open society generally outweigh the detriments.  All too often 
attempts to restrict the freedom in the name of some imagined necessity have tended to stifle public 
discussion and criticism of government.  The Court should be astute not to accept at face value claims 
by the legislature and the Executive that freedom of communication will, unless curtailed, bring about 
corruption and distortion of the political process.19
 
McHugh J likewise was convinced of the necessity in a representative democracy that 
electors be able to communicate their own arguments and opinions to other members 
                                                                                                                                            
Nicholas Aroney ‘A Seductive Plausibility: Freedom of Speech in the Constitution’ (1995) 18(2) 
University of Queensland Law Journal 249; Jeffrey Goldsworthy ‘Constitutional Implications and 
Freedom of Political Speech’ (1997) 23 Monash University Law Review 362; H P Lee ‘The Australian 
High Court and Implied Fundamental Guarantees’ (1993) Public Law 606. 
15 (1992) 177 CLR 106.  
16 Mason CJ Deane Toohey Gaudron McHugh JJ, Brennan and Dawson JJ dissenting). 
17 Mason CJ p137-138. 
18 144-145. 
19 145; Deane and Toohey JJ were similarly unconvinced that the desire to eliminate corruption 
justified the legislation’s impact on political communication during an election period (175). 
of the community concerning those issues.  Electors needed information to make an 
informed judgment of governments and policies.20
 
Subsequent Australian Cases 
Subsequent High Court decisions have clarified the scope and nature of the freedom 
and the approach to be applied in determining the validity of laws said to conflict with 
the freedom.21  It has been determined that the freedom is a protection from laws 
which seek to unjustifiably derogate from the freedom, rather than a source of positive 
rights.  The High Court in Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation22 clarified 
that a two stage approach was required when assessing laws against the freedom, 
asking whether the law effectively burdens freedom of communication about 
government or political matters in terms, operation or effect; and secondly, if so, 
whether the law is reasonably appropriate and adapted to serve a legitimate end the 
fulfilment of which is compatible with the constitutionally prescribed system of 
representative and responsible government. 
 
The High Court has also made clear that the freedom of political communication in 
Australia can, like the equivalent provision in the United States Bill of Rights, include 
non-verbal communication.  Brennan CJ in Levy v Victoria23 cited American 
authority for the proposition that silent protests, flag burning and other 
communication could fall within the freedom.24  After summarising the American 
authorities, Smith concludes 
 
Given this case history, it is too late to argue that a gift of money, at least when made to a political 
candidate, is not a form of protected symbolic speech.  Such a gift is an action intended to convey 
support for a candidate and, one can presume, his or her views.25
 
While this principle has not been clarified in many of the Australian cases, given our 
relatively fewer number of decisions, it seems from the Levy decision that one can 
extrapolate that the High Court would consider a political donation to attract the 
description of ‘political communication’.  Certainly this is the basis on which 
Australian commentators have proceeded,26 as have the American cases.27
                                                 
20 231; to like effect Gaudron J 211-212. 
21 Eg Theophanous v Herald and Weekly Times Limited (1994) 182 CLR 104; Levy v Victoria (1997) 
189 CLR 579; Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520; Coleman v Power 
(2004). 
22 (1997) 189 CLR 520, 567. 
23 (1997) 189 CLR 579, 594; to like effect McHugh J (622) and Kirby J (638)(both also citing 
American cases). 
24 American cases have found the following to be ‘speech’ within the First Amendment:  refusing to 
salute the American flag (West Virginia State Board of Education v Barnette (1943) 319 US 624, 642; 
displaying a flag (Stromberg v California (1931) 283 US 359, 369; burning a flag (Texas v Johnson 
(1989) 491 US 397, 405; wearing an armband to protest war (Tinker v Des Moines Independent 
Community School District (1969) 393 US 503, 505-506; displaying a swastika (National Socialist 
Party of America v Village of Skokie (1977) 432 US 43, 44; holding a parade although it had no 
particular theme (Hurley v Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston (1995) 515 US 
557, 570. 
25 Bradley Smith ‘Money Talks: Speech, Corruption, Equality and Campaign Finance’ (1997) 86 
Georgetown Law Journal 45, 50. 
26 Deborah Cass and Sonia Burrows ‘Commonwealth Regulation of Campaign Finance: Public 
Funding, Disclosure and Expenditure Limits’ (2000) 22 Sydney Law Review 447, 456-460; Joo-Cheung 
Tham and David Grove ‘Public Funding and Expenditure Regulation of Australian Political Parties: 
Some Reflections’ (2004) 32 Federal Law Review 397, 420-421. 
 
(b) United States Jurisprudence28
The leading American case in this field is Buckley v Valeo29 where the Supreme Court 
considered legislation, passed in response to Watergate, that (a) capped political 
donations by individuals or groups to $1000 for any single federal candidate; (b) 
limited contributions to any such candidate by political committees to $5000; (c) 
imposed a $25 000 annual limitation on total contributions by any contributor; (d) 
limited independent expenditures by an individual or group advocating the election or 
defeat of a federal candidate to $1000 per year; and set limits, depending on the office 
involved, of expenditure by candidates for federal office during any calendar year, 
and overall limits.  A disclosure obligation was also imposed in respect of 
contributions.  The legislation was challenged on the basis of the First Amendment 
(freedom of speech) and Fifth Amendment (equal protection). 
 
A majority of the Supreme Court found the provisions imposing limits on political 
donations did not infringe First Amendment speech and were supported by substantial 
governmental interests in limiting corruption and the appearance of corruption.  
However, provisions limiting independent political expenditures by individuals and 
groups and fixing ceilings on overall campaign expenditures by candidates were 
unconstitutional as contrary to the First Amendment, and were not justified by the 
government interest in preventing actual or perceived corruption or from equalisation 
concerns.  For similar reasons, provisions limiting the amount of personal 
expenditures by a candidate were also invalid as conflicting with the First 
Amendment. 
 
The majority invalidated the expenditure provisions because 
 
A restriction on the amount of money a person or group can spend on political communication during a 
campaign necessarily reduces the quantity of expression by restricting the number of issues discussed, 
the depth of their exploration and the size of the audience reached.  This is because virtually every 
means of communicating ideas in today’s mass society requires the expenditure of money … The 
electorate’s increasing dependence on television, radio and other mass media for news and information 
has made these expensive modes of communication indispensable instruments of effective political 
speech.  Being free to engage in unlimited political expression subject to a ceiling on expenditures is 
like being free to drive an automobile as far and as often as one desires on a single tank of gasoline.30
                                                                                                                                            
27 Eg Central Hudson Gas and Electric Corp v Public Service Commission of New York (1980) 447 US 
557, the court finding that a corporation’s advertising amounted to speech. 
28 We must exercise the usual caution here with international comparisons – the provisions are not 
identical.  For example, the United States provision is applied to speech, while the Australian version 
relates to communication; in the United States the provision is a source of positive rights, while in 
Australia the right is a negative one, in that it is a freedom from laws that (unreasonably) interfere; the 
American right is express, while the Australian freedom is implicitly derived from the text and 
structure of the Constitution.  Another view regarding the use of United States materials in interpreting 
the freedom of political communication appears in Dan Meagher ‘The Fighting Words Doctrine: Off 
the First Amendment Canvas and Into the Implied Freedom Ring?’ (2005) 28 University of New South 
Wales Law Journal 852. 
29 (1976) 424 US 1; see for detailed discussion Frank Sorauf ‘Politics, Experience and the First 
Amendment: The Case of American Campaign Finance’ (1994) 94 Columbia Law Review 1348; J 
Skelly Wright ‘Money and the Pollution of Politics: Is the First Amendment an Obstacle to Political 
Equality?’ (1982) 82 Columbia Law Review 609; and Kenneth Levit ‘Campaign Finance Reform and 
the Return of Buckley v Valeo’ (1993) 103 Yale Law Journal 469. 
30 19 (Burger CJ, Brennan Stewart Powell Blackmun Rehnquist JJ)(Marshall J agreed the provisions 
limiting independent political expenditures by individual groups and fixing overall ceilings on 
 
The majority agreed that the act of donating money to a candidate was a form of 
speech.31  While First Amendment freedoms were not absolute and needed to be 
balanced against legitimate government interests, and while the government interest 
in preventing corruption or the perception of corruption was legitimate, the majority 
found the interest did not justify the ceiling on expenditures,32 or the limit on 
candidate’s personal expenditure.   It was not clear that such limits were reasonably 
necessary to prevent corruption, particularly as they were set at very low levels.  
Arguments that the funds available to candidates needed to be ‘equalised’ were not 
accepted by the court as legitimate considerations.33  The majority was not convinced, 
however, that the contribution limitations imposed by the Act would have any real 
effect on the funding of campaigns and political associations; it would merely lead to 
candidates seeking contributions from a broader base.34  As a result, these were valid, 
reflecting legitimate governmental interests,35 as were the disclosure requirements.36  
In dissent on this point, Burger CJ would also have invalidated the private donation 
limits.37   
 
The Court in Buckley also introduced a distinction between two types of ‘political’ 
speech: communication that expressly advocated the election or defeat of a clearly 
identifiable candidate (which would not be entitled to protection under the First 
Amendment), and communication that was issues-based (which would be entitled to a 
higher level of protection under the First Amendment).  This became known as the 
‘magic words’ test – ads which avoided the magic words such as ‘vote for’, ‘elect’, 
‘support’, ‘defeat’ etc could not be the subject of regulation.  This distinction would 
seem to be a difficult one to make, as a later case would attest.  One might wonder 
whether the distinction between advocacy and issue-based communication is easy to 
make, given that often the issue-based communication was taking place during or near 
election periods. 
 
As indicated above, subsequent decisions have largely confirmed these principles, and 
the Supreme Court struck down a provision whereby if a self-funding candidate 
reached a certain spending limit, their opponent would be able to receive outside 
donations at treble the normal limit from individuals.  The court found that differential 
                                                                                                                                            
expenditure by candidates was unconstitutional, but would have upheld limits on the amount of 
personal expenditure by a candidate); White J dissenting and Stevens J not participating. 
31 ‘The plain effect of the (section) is to prohibit all individuals … from voicing their views relative to a 
clearly identified candidate through means that entail expenditures of more than $1000 during a 
calendar year’ (39). 
32 45; for further discussion of the case see Deborah Goldberg and Brenda Wright ‘Defending 
Campaign Contribution Limits After Randall v Sorrell (2008) 63 New York University Annual Survey 
of American Law 661.and Richard Briffault ‘The Return of Spending Limits: Campaign Finance After 
Landell v Sorrell (2005) 32 Fordham Urban Law Journal 399. 
33 54; the Supreme Court was similarly unimpressed with such arguments in the recent decision of 
Davis v Federal Election Commission (2008) 128 S Ct 2759, 2772. 
34 21-22. 
35 The Supreme Court had a similar view of limits on campaign contributions by an individual in Nixon 
v Shrink Missouri Government Pac et al (2000) 528 US 377. 
36 The Supreme Court recently clarified in Davis that disclosure requirements impact privacy of donors 
so a clear justification is required:  Davis v Federal Electoral Commission (2008) 128 S Ct 2759, 2774. 
37 ‘We do little but engage in word games unless we recognise that people – candidates and 
contributors – spend money on political activity because they wish to communicate ideas, and their 
constitutional interest in doing so is precisely the same whether they or someone else utters the words’ 
(244). 
contribution limits for candidates in competition with one another was not acceptable 
to First Amendment rights.38  In some cases, a distinction has been drawn depending 
on whether the donor is an individual or a large organisation,39 on the basis that an 
individual might be more constitutionally entitled to communication through the 
making of a donation as a democratic right, compared with an organisation.  Further, 
if an organisation is larger, then it may be in a position to make a larger donation.  
The size of a donation might influence perceptions of corruption or bias. 
 
The status quo changed in 2006 when the Supreme Court decided Randall v Sorrell,40 
a case involving a challenge to a Vermont law limiting individual contributions to 
state candidates (such limits had been upheld in Buckley) and imposing campaign 
spending limits.  A majority of the Court struck down the limits as too low, as well as 
the limits on total election spending.41  Although the Court apparently endorsed the 
Buckley dichotomy between contributions and spending, this was the first occasion 
that the Supreme Court had found that a contribution limit was unconstitutional, 
apparently indicating less ability to regulate contributions than had been thought to be 
the case in the years after Buckley.42  The majority found the actual limits imposed in 
the Act to be disproportionate to the public purposes they were intended to advance.43
 
In the other recent Supreme Court decision in this area, Federal Election Commission 
v Wisconsin Right to Life Inc,44 (Wisconsin II) the court re-affirmed First Amendment 
principles in this area and thereby reduced the scope for campaign funding regulation.  
The case involved the distinction noted in Buckley between express advocacy and 
issues-based discussion.  Congress had passed a law that purported to restrict 
advertising referring to a candidate for federal office within 60 days of a general 
election or 30 days of a primary, where they were targeted at the candidate’s 
constituency.  Ads began appearing which focussed on a current legislative issue, took 
a position on it and tried to convince the public to adopt that position, and then urged 
viewers to contact named public officials about that issue to find out their views, or in 
some cases told viewers what the views of public officials was in relation to the issue.  
In McConnell, the Supreme Court found that, taking into account the context of such 
ads, they were express advocacy so the law regulating them was valid and did not 
offend the First Amendment.45  However, a differently constituted court in FEC v 
                                                 
38 Davis v Federal Election Commission (2008) 128 S Ct 2759 (per Roberts CJ Scalia Kennedy 
Thomas and Alito JJ, Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer JJ dissenting in part). 
39 Austin v Michigan Chamber of Commerce (1990) 494 US 652. 
40 (2006) 126 S Ct 2479. 
41 Of the majority, three (Scalia Thomas and Kennedy JJ (more contentiously) indicated their view that 
the First Amendment forbids any limits on donations or spending), while three others including Roberts 
CJ, Breyer and Alito JJ apparently endorsed the differential treatment of spending and donations, but 
found the donation limits here too low).  In dissent, Stevens Souter and Ginsburg JJ would have upheld 
the legislation. 
42 The majority proposed a two-step test to determine validity of an electoral finance law:  (1) whether 
there were danger signs that the limits imposed may harm the electoral process by preventing 
challengers from mounting effective campaigns against incumbents, threatening accountability; and 
then (2) an assessment of relevant factors including what the limit was, whether the limit on party 
contributions to candidates was the same as the limit on individual contributions to candidates, whether 
exceptions existed for volunteer expenses, whether the ceiling was adjusted for inflation, and whether 
there was any special justification for the donation limits (2495-99).  
43 2500. 
44 (2007) 127 S Ct 2652. 
45 McConnell v FEC (2003) 540 US 93. 
Wisconsin II found that they were not express advocacy, so the law could not regulate 
them consistently with the First Amendment.46
 
Chief Justice Roberts adopted a narrow view of what was ‘express advocacy’:  that 
the ad must be susceptible of no other reasonable interpretation other than as an 
appeal to vote for or against a specific candidate.  These ads did not meet the test, so 
could not be regulated as ‘express advocacy’.47   
 
(c) Canadian Jurisprudence 
There have been many attempts to regulate electoral financing over the years, some 
being held contrary to the Charter.48  For those not familiar with the Charter, s2(b) 
guarantees freedom of expression and s2(d) guarantees freedom of association.  
Section 1 of the Charter clarifies that the rights in the Charter are not absolute, and 
must be balanced against ‘reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably 
justified in a free and democratic society’.  In other words, a balancing exercise is 
called for in assessing the constitutional validity of laws which impinge on Charter 
freedoms, a class which certainly includes electoral financing laws.  One relevant 
factor is whether the laws are the ‘least drastic means’ test; in other words, whether 
the laws introduced, although invasive of Charter freedoms, were the least intrusive 
means possible to achieve legitimate objectives.49
 
More recent reforms have included the Elections Act 2003, which introduced a limit 
on contributions by individuals to each political party, its candidates and associations 
of $5000 total.  Corporate and union contributions to national political party 
organisations were prohibited, although such bodies could contribute up to $1000 to 
individual candidates.  Disclosure obligations in relation to donations were 
increased.50  The Accountability Act 2006 went further, reducing the maximum 
individual contribution from $5000 to $1000, and totally banning corporate and union 
contributions.    
                                                 
46 Roberts CJ, Scalia Thomas Kennedy and Alito JJ, Souter Stevens Ginsburg and Breyer JJ dissenting 
(2673). 
47 The decision has had a generally hostile reception among writers:  see for example Richard Briffault 
‘WRTL and Randall: The Roberts Court and the Unsettling of Campaign Finance Law’ (2007) 68 Ohio 
State Law Journal 807; ‘WRTL II: The Sharpest Turn in Campaign Finance’s Long and Winding 
Road’ (2008) 1 Albany Governmental Law Review 101; Daniel Ortiz ‘The Difference Two Justices 
Make: FEC v Wisconsin Right to Life Inc II and the Destabilisation of Campaign Finance Regulation’ 
(2008) 1 Albany Governmental Law Review 141; Kurt Hohenstein ‘Clio, Meet Buckley – Buckley, Clio: 
Reintroducing History to Unravel the Tangle of Campaign Finance Reform’ (2008) 1 Albany 
Governmental Law Review 63; and Deborah Goldberg and Brenda Wright ‘Defending Campaign 
Contribution Limits After Randall v Sorrell (2008) 63 New York University Annual Survey of American 
Law 661. 
48 Examples include National Citizens’ Coalition AG Canada (1984) 11 D.L.R. (4th) 481 (Alta 
QB)(amendments prohibiting anyone who was not a candidate for election and who was not acting on 
behalf of a registered party or candidate for election from incurring election expenses during an 
election period struck down as an unjustified breach of the guarantee of freedom of expression); and 
Somerville v Canada (1996) 136 D.L.R. (4th) 205, where a limit on third party expenditure of $1000 
was struck down on the same basis.  The Supreme Court of Canada validated a ceiling on third party 
election expenditures of $150 000, and a maximum of $3000 in each electorate (known as a ‘riding’ in 
Canada) as reasonable regulation. 
49 Applying this test, the Supreme Court of Canada validated a ceiling on third party election 
expenditure of $150 000, and a maximum of $3000 in each electorate:  Harper v Canada (2004) 1 SCR 
827; cf Libman v Quebec (1997) 3 SCR 569. 
50 As a partial trade-off, the amount of public funding of Canadian political parties was increased. 
 
While the constitutionality of such provisions is open to doubt and has been 
questioned,51 they also run the danger of being seen as self-serving.  Using evidence 
of past political donation activity, Feasby52 argues the changes introduced by the 
minority Conservative government in the Accountability Act will impact most 
seriously on the Liberal Party, the main Opposition party in Canada.  He uses this 
example to suggest, as others have,53 that electoral laws require particular scrutiny by 
the judges, given the obvious tendency of the government in power to pass laws that 
advantages itself at the expense of opposition parties, and the inherent conflict of 
interest that may actually have occurred or be perceived to have occurred.  In other 
words, if judicial deference to choices that the Parliament makes is an important 
factor in assessing Charter challenges to legislation, it should be less of a factor in this 
context.  As Pildes concludes: 
 
Constitutional law must play a role in constraining partisan or incumbent self-entrenchment that 
inappropriately manipulates the ground rules of democracy.  That functional justification for judicial 
review will be present in all constitutional democracies.54
 
(d) British Approach 
The United Kingdom’s scheme was enacted in the Political Parties, Elections and 
Referendums Act 2000 (PPERA).55  The Act limits campaign expenditure56 in the 
year before an election to almost 20 million pounds.  The exact amount allowed is 
calculated by a formula whereby 30 000 pounds is multiplied by the number of seats 
contested in order to provide a maximum spend.57  There was recently a proposal to 
reduce the 20 million pound ceiling to 15 million pounds.58  These provisions work 
with other legislation which generally prohibits political advertising.59  There are 
criminal penalties for breach of the limits.60  Extensive disclosure provisions also 
apply. 
 
The PPERA limits third party (including corporations and unions) expenditure in the 
year before an election to 10 000 pounds in England, and 5000 pounds in each of 
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland.  This parties wishing to donate above that limit 
must register with the Electoral Commission.  Once this has occurred, limits increase 
                                                 
51 Colin Feasby ‘Constitutional Questions About Canada’s New Political Finance Regime’ (2007) 45 
Osgoode Hall Law Journal 513. 
52 Colin Feasby ‘Constitutional Questions About Canada’s New Political Finance Regime’ (2007) 45 
Osgoode Hall Law Journal 513, 542-543. 
53 Eg John Hart Ely Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review (1980); Samuel Issacharoff 
and Richard Pildes ‘Politics as Markets: Partisan Lockups of the Democratic Process’ (1998) 50 
Stanford Law Review 643; Richard Pildes ‘The Theory of Political Communication’ (1999) 85 Virginia 
Law Review 1605. 
54 ‘The Supreme Court 2003 Term – Foreword: Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics’ (2004) 
118 Harvard Law Review 29, 154. 
55 See for detailed discussion Keith Ewing The Cost of Democracy: Party Funding in Modern British 
Politics (2007). 
56 Defined to include party political broadcasts, advertising, unsolicited material sent to electors, any 
document setting out the party’s policies, market research conducted on the electorate, press conference 
or other media expenses, transport of party leaders and officials, and rallies and public meetings 
57 Schedule 9 Part II s3. 
58 United Kingdom Ministry of Justice Party Finance and Expenditure in the United Kingdom: The 
Government’s Proposals (2008) p40 (‘White Paper’). 
59 Communication Act 2003 (UK) s321, Chapter 21. 
60 See also the Political Parties and Elections Bill 2008 (UK). 
to 793 500 in England, 108 000 pounds in Scotland, 60 000 pounds in Wales and 27 
000 pounds in Northern Ireland.61  The United Kingdom Parliament did not act on a 
recommendation from a 2007 commissioned report which recommended capping 
individual donations at 50 000 pounds.62  The limits on donations have been criticised 
for their lack of enforceability.63
 
The United Kingdom has adopted the European Convention on Human Rights,64 
Article 10 of which protects the right to receive and impart information and ideas 
without interference by a public authority.  It acknowledges that this right must be 
balanced against other considerations, most relevantly here conditions/restrictions 
considered necessary in a democratic society.  It is similar in this respect to Article 19 
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, although that article more 
strictly protects the right by allowing derogations from the right only where necessary 
to protect the reputation of others, to protect public order, public health or morals.65
 
The European Court of Human Rights found that a 1983 British Act limiting political 
speech amounted to a violation of Article 10.66  Section 75(1) of the Representation 
Act 1983 (UK) prohibited any expenditure greater than 5 pounds by a third party to 
promote a candidate for political office.  Bowman was charged with an offence 
against s75 after she circulated a large number of leaflets pointing out the views of 
particular candidates in relation to abortion law, together with some material 
presenting a pro-life position.  This occurred just prior to a general election. 
 
The government sought to justify the provisions on several bases, including that (a) it 
stopped wealthy third parties from campaigning for or against a particular candidate 
or issuing material; (b) ensured candidates remained independent of the influence of 
powerful interest groups; and (c) it prevented the political debate from being overly 
focussed on one issue (which lobby groups would tend to target) rather than a range 
of issues. 
 
In declaring the law to be inconsistent with Article 10, the Court found it was 
disproportionate to any legitimate end.  Free elections and freedom of expression 
formed the bedrock of any democratic system, with the latter necessary to make sure 
the choice of voters at an election was free.67  There was no evidence Bowman’s 
advocacy would harm any specific candidate, because readers might use the material 
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to form a range of views about candidates.  The government could not show that the 
limit of 5 pounds here was necessary to achieve the legitimate end of securing 
equality among candidates given there were no restrictions on the press in supporting 
or opposing a particular candidate, or upon parties or candidates advertising, provided 
it was not intended to promote or prejudice the electoral prospects of any particular 
candidate in a particular constituency.68  I am not aware that the validity of the 
PPERA has been tested in terms of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
 
Summary of Jurisprudence on Electoral Finance Laws 
In summary then it can be seen that whether or not a country has a bill of rights, 
courts in various jurisdictions have closely scrutinised legislation that limits 
participation in democratic processes.  They recognise some legitimate government 
interest in regulating electoral financing, but in many cases have found that the end 
did not justify the means in terms of restrictions on funding contributions, spending 
etc.   
 
Part B: Arguments in Favour of Limits on Donations/Campaign Spending 
I explore here the arguments in favour of and against restrictions, before concluding 
with an opinion of which types of restrictions the Australian Government might be 
able to introduce that would avoid constitutional difficulty, given the international 
experience. 
 
I begin this consideration from a starting point that, as has been recognised 
substantially in many jurisdictions, freedom of thought, speech and communication is 
an essential aspect of a democracy.  It is a fundamental right that must be accorded 
due respect.  It is not a desirable extra in a system of representative government where 
the sovereignty of the people is accepted.  While no right is absolute, and courts will 
allow intrusions into fundamental human rights, the clearest and most cogent 
justification must be given, and shown.  I also bear in mind the work of public choice 
theorists who argue that governments will attempt to maximise their position and 
power, and must be checked by independent, outside interests.69  This accords of 
course with the theory underlying the doctrine of judicial review and the separation of 
powers.  Thus, arguments as to the need for such regulation must be very closely 
scrutinized by the courts.  Finally, I bear in mind the faith we place in the people to be 
able to digest communications they receive, to judge whether they are being told the 
truth, whether policies are in the best interests of the country and/or themselves etc.  
In this way, I am sceptical of the need for the government to step in to regulate speech 
to ‘protect’ the public from too much, incomplete, or incorrect information. 
 
(1) Corruption 
It might be argued that it is necessary to introduce a limit on the amount by which an 
individual can donate to a candidate or political party in order to reduce the likelihood 
of, or the perception that, the donor is somehow buying political candidate or party.  
Similarly, it might be argued that it is necessary to limit a candidate’s spending in 
order to reduce their dependence on donations, which would then reduce the 
likelihood they have been ‘bought off’ by a particular donor.  It can readily be 
acknowledged that it would not be good in terms of faith in our political institutions if 
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it were perceived (whether or not it was actually the case) that politicians or political 
parties had been ‘bought off’ by a particular donor, or were doing the bidding of their 
most generous donors.  Both the High Court of Australia and the Supreme Court of 
the United States have recognised this as a legitimate government interest in the 
context of regulation of political funding.70  This rationale is also referred to in 
several places in the Federal Government’s Green Paper on Electoral Reform in 
support of the case for change.71
 
I would find this argument convincing if I had seen evidence of a link between 
political donations and voting behaviour from politicians.  However, of the many 
studies that have sought to establish whether such a link exists, most have found little 
evidence that a politician’s voting behaviour is in fact affected by donations that 
might have been made.72  As Hall and Wayman write: 
 
Despite the claims of the institutional critics and the growing public concern over (lobby groups) 
during the past decade, the scientific evidence that political money matters in legislative decision 
making is surprisingly weak.  Considerable research on members’ voting decisions offers little support 
for the popular view that (lobby groups) money permits interests to buy or rent votes on matters that 
affect them.73
 




Some argue that it is necessary to limit the quantum of donations to candidates or 
parties, or limit the amount that a candidate can spend, in order to make elections as 
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‘equal’ as possible among candidates.75  These arguments draw support from the 
principle of voting equality inherent in our system of democracy, and argue that 
voting equality implies participation equality.76  Adherents to the equality argument 
question the libertarian conception of free speech as ignoring existing inequalities in 
private ownership of wealth and property which impact on participation in the 
political process.77
 
Again, in my view evidence of such existing inequality is necessary before accepting 
such a view.  If there were evidence that either of the major political parties enjoyed a 
significant financial advantage over the other, evidenced by the quantum of private 
donations, or their ability to fund election campaigns, it would at least be arguable 
that such a disparity could affect the legitimacy of the choice that electors would be 
making each time they were asked to vote.  However, in my view there are several 
difficulties with such an argument.78
 
Firstly, there is little evidence of great funding disparities in Australia, at least as 
between the major political parties.  The most recent evidence available to us (which 
is up to 1996, before disclosure rules changed) suggests that the Australian Labor 
Party spent almost $40 million between 1984-1996.  The Liberal Party during that 
same time period spent almost $35 million.79  The Green Paper notes that after the 
rules changed, and parties were required to disclose only total expenses rather than 
total election expenses, the estimate of electoral expenses in 2004 for the Australian 
Labor Party was $19.4 million and the Liberal Party $22 million.  These figures don’t 
indicate that either of the major political parties is at a real disadvantage, in terms of 
their ability to fund electoral campaigns.   
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Considering private donations to the major political parties,80 according to the 
Australian Electoral Commission the Australian Labor Party received approximately 
$120 million in private funding in the years between 2002-2003 and 2004-2005, 
compared with the Liberal Party which received approximately $104 million.  In the 
years between 1999-2000 and 2001-2002, the Australian Labor Party received about 
$98 million in private donations, and the Liberal Party approximately $81 million.81   
 
Another argument against the so-called need for equality is that the mere fact that a 
candidate, or a party, may be able to collect large levels of donations may in fact 
reflect the popularity of the platform or the candidate.  One of the impressive things 
about the political campaign of United States President Barack Obama in 2008 was 
his ability to raise very large levels of donations to his campaign, both to be the 
Democratic nominee, and then to run for President.  These massive donation levels 
showed the extremely large support base from which this candidate drew, reflecting 
the voice of the American people.  It is hard to see in this context how limiting the 
amount that a person could donate to a candidate would have assisted in making the 
campaign or the result more democratic.  So far from impeding democracy, the 
freedom that an individual has to support a particular candidate or party, and to 
express that support by financially donating to that candidate or party, reflects 
democracy at work. 
 
The American Courts have generally not been impressed with the argument that in 
order to protect one person’s freedom of speech, it is necessary to limit another’s 
freedom of speech.82  Fried claims that if it were the position that a government could 
silence certain speakers in order to ensure ‘others’ are heard, ‘it is but a short step to 
suppression pure and simple’.83  Others claim that far from creating equality, 
campaign finance restrictions actually promote inequality by making it tougher for 
challengers to incumbents to raise the funding they need, and favour those who know 
how the system works, as opposed to fledgeling, grassroots campaigners who may not 
be aware of the rules or how to (legally) circumvent them.84  There is also the view 
that the mere fact someone spends a lot of money on their candidacy is no guarantee 
of electoral success – though it might purchase more advertising, voters may not like 
the message.  Researchers of some recent elections have found that many incumbents 
won re-election while spending much less than their opponents.85  In any event, 
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experienced participants in this process will often be able to find legal loopholes to 
avoid limits.86
 
Part C: Other Issues Relevant to the Constitutionality of Political Funding Reform  
Several other issues are raised by the overseas authorities, particularly the United 
States cases, in the context of campaign finance reform, which I now consider. 
 
(1) The Less Drastic Means Doctrine 
In several American cases considering First Amendment rights, the Court has 
considered as one relevant factor in assessing the constitutionality of the law, whether 
there were less drastic means (in other words, means less intrusive of human rights) 
that were available to the government to pursue what may be a legitimate objective.  
So, for example, in assessing whether spending limits on candidates are justified to 
prevent corruption, the Court might find that they are not justified because they are 
intrusive, and the government interest in preventing corruption could less invasively 
be met by introducing a disclosure regime.87
 
There is some support for this doctrine in the Australian case law.  A unanimous court 
in Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation seemed to accept the validity of such 
an approach, in the current context: 
 
In ACTV for example, a majority of this Court held that a law seriously impeding discussion during the 
course of a federal election was invalid because there were other less drastic means by which the 
objectives of the law could be achieved.88
 
However, Brennan CJ expressly disavowed this approach in Levy:   
 
Under our Constitution, the courts do not assume the power to determine that some more limited 
restriction than that imposed by an impugned law could suffice to achieve a legitimate purpose.  The 
courts acknowledge that the law-maker’s power to determine the sufficiency of the means of achieving 
the legitimate purpose, reserving only a jurisdiction to determine whether the means adopted could 
reasonably be considered to be appropriate and adapted to the fulfilment of the purpose.89
 
I wonder with respect whether such a precise delineation can be made between what 
is ‘reasonably appropriate and adapted’ and whether less drastic means are available.  
In other words, perhaps the fact that less drastic means are available to achieve 
legitimate ends might suggest that the law is not reasonably appropriate and adapted 
to achieving a legitimate end.  It is worth remembering also that the phrase 
‘reasonably appropriate and adapted’ is itself derived from a United States decision.90   
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Apart from the comments in Lange cited above, the High Court of Australia clearly 
has used something akin to (at the very least) the ‘less drastic means’ test in 
considering the constitutionality of legislation, though in different contexts to the one 
now being considered. 
 
For example, in the Castlemaine Tooheys Ltd v South Australia91 decision regarding 
s92 of the Constitution, the High Court did consider the possibility of other regulatory 
options: 
 
Where a law on its face is apt to secure a legitimate object but its effect is to impose a discriminatory 
burden upon interstate trade as against intrastate trade, the existence of reasonable non-discriminatory 
alternative means of securing that legitimate object suggests that the (law is invalid as involving 
prohibited discrimination). 
 
In another context considering laws providing for bicentennial celebrations in 
Australia,92 the High Court refused to accept provisions giving the Bicentennial 
Authority monopoly use over certain words, given that those words could be  used in 
other contexts for legitimate commercial reasons.  The court concluded that protection 
of the integrity of the bicentennial celebrations did not require such prohibition; that 
the law was disproportionate to the need to protect the commemoration powers of the 
authority.93  Though the court did not phrase its reasoning by saying something like 
‘although the authority has legitimate purposes, there are less drastic powers it could 
be given in order to effect its purposes that would be less invasive of established 
commercial freedoms, so the law is unconstitutional’, I would submit that the above 
comments are very similar in effect.  As a result, I believe there is some Australian 
support in the constitutional context for such a test. 
 
Proceeding on the basis that this is a relevant doctrine, we should apply this to the 
question of limits on campaign funding.  It is difficult of course because no specific 
limits on political donations or expenditure by candidates or parties have been 
suggested in the Green Paper.  However, I would be very sceptical of the need for 
such laws, and it is submitted a relevant factor in assessing the constitutional validity 
of such laws, given their interference with the freedom of communication, would be 
whether other measures are available to achieve the kinds of purposes said to be 
achieved by such measures.   
 
The alternatives include a register of political donations and full disclosure of 
donations at a very low threshold, enforcement of criminal provisions dealing with 
corruptions and bribes, and a system by which some public funding is provided to 
political parties (which already occurs).  To the extent that corruption and equality 
arguments remain a concern (and I have given my reasons for thinking they are not 
justifications for further electoral funding reform), clearly measures already exist to 
deal with them, and it is not clear whether measures more invasive of the freedom of 
political communication are in fact necessary.  I don’t believe that we should defer to 
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Parliament’s judgment about the necessity or otherwise of laws, particularly in this 
context where the subject matter being considered is very ‘close to the bone’ as it 
were, and where politicians and political parties can be expected to act in ways that 
they think will advantage themselves, rather than build or maintain a robust 
democracy. 
 
(2) The Individual/Organisation Distinction 
As indicated above, some American cases have drawn a distinction based on whether 
the donor is an individual or an organisation.94  It is argued that, because freedom of 
communication/freedom of speech is fundamental to the right of an individual to 
participate in the electoral process, that restrictions on the ability of an organisation to 
make donations to political candidates or individuals should be more acceptable.  As 
indicated, the recent Canadian reforms completely ban donations by organisations, 
while allowing some donations by individuals.   
 
The Federal Government’s discussion paper canvasses this issue separately from the 
general question of caps.  In considering the question of differential treatment of bans 
or caps on donations from organisations, the Green Paper considers: 
 
An argument in favour of this approach is that the Government is elected by individuals and is there to 
represent the will of its citizens, rather than organisational interests.  In that case, individuals should be 
encouraged to contribute to those running for office by allowing them to give donations to their party 
of choice, whereas organisations should not be allowed to influence candidates or parties running for 
office.  Banning donations from organisations is argued to have the added advantage of preventing 
wealthy individuals from donating to political parties and candidates through a range of different 
corporations or organisations, thereby undermining any caps on donations which may be in place. 
 
An argument against banning donations from organisations is that different types of organisations play 
a variety of important roles in modern society – corporations have legitimate interests in government 
decisions; trade unions exist to represent the interests of their membership base; while community 
groups can be formed around important social or environmental issues.95
 
Given the terms in which the freedom of political communication has been framed in 
Australia, it is submitted there is a respectable argument that the freedom is limited to 
individuals rather than organisations.96  The freedom exists because the Constitution 
is based on the principle of representative democracy.  Citizens need to be able to 
engage in political discussion in order to give effect to this system.  On one view, then, 
the freedom is limited to individuals and thus a law banning political donations by 
organisations97 would not offend the freedom since such organisations are not 
necessarily democratic, are not citizens and do not vote at elections.  The Parliament 
does not represent that organisation.  It may be argued also that an organisation, 
particularly a well-resourced one, might be more easily perceived as able to influence 
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government decision making, in other words the strength in numbers argument.  This 
would justify the Commonwealth being able to regulate donations from such 
organisations.98   
 
However, while it may be accepted that an organisation may not directly have 
freedom of communication, we need to remember that communication is two-way – it 
is a right to be heard but also a right to hear.  It might be argued that, in order for 
citizens to be able to participate effectively in a democracy, they must have access to 
a range of views on political matters, and some of these views might be expressed by 
organisations.  As Mason CJ said in ACTV v Commonwealth 
 
Individual judgment … on so many issues turns upon free public discussion in the media of the views 
of all interested persons, groups and bodies and on public participation in, and access to, that 
discussion.99
 
McHugh J agreed that voters had a constitutional right to convey and receive 
opinions.100  Deane and Toohey JJ in Nationwide News v Willis said that freedom of 
political discussion necessarily involved the freedom to maintain and consider claims 
and opinions about political matters.101  And the Court was unanimous in Lange that 
‘common convenience and welfare of Australian society are advanced by discussion – 
the giving and receiving of information – about government and political matters’.102
 
I have concluded that no distinction should be made, in terms of the constitutional 
freedom of communication, between donors according to whether they are individuals 
or organisations.  While it is true that the freedom is cast in terms of democracy and 
representative government, and an organisation does not have a right to vote nor could 
it expect Parliament to represent its view, I believe that individual citizens have a 
right to receive the views of the organisation, in order to best exercise their 
democratic rights.  These views might be expressed directly through payment for 
political advertising, or indirectly by funding candidates who express (broadly or 
narrowly) the views of the organisation.   
 
(3) The Donations/Expenditure Distinction 
At the heart of the American jurisprudence in this area is the notion that differential 
treatment should be applied to donations to candidates and parties on the one hand, 
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and actual campaign expenditure on the other.103  The Green Paper treats them as 
separate policy options.104  As the result in Buckley demonstrates, the Supreme Court 
in that decision was prepared to validate the former, but not the latter, under First 
Amendment principles.105  This distinction has apparently been retained, at least by 
name, although some commentators see in the very recent cases an actual (if not 
formal) departure from the Buckley dichotomy: 
 
Randall re-affirmed the Court’s continued adherence to the contribution-expenditure distinction, which 
has long been at the heart of our campaign finance jurisprudence, while demonstrating that a majority 
of the Court rejects the distinction.106   
 
Perhaps the key passage in terms of the explanation of the Buckley court’s distinction 
between the two kinds of limits is this one: 
 
By contrast with a limitation upon expenditures for political expression, a limitation upon the amount 
that any one person or group may contribute to a candidate or political committee entails only a 
marginal restriction upon the contributor’s ability to engage free communication.  A contribution 
serves as a general expression of support for the candidate and his views, but does not communicate the 
underlying basis for the support … A limitation on the amount of money a person may give to a 
candidate or campaign organisation thus involves little direct restraint on his political communication, 
for it permits the symbolic expression of support evidenced by a contribution but does not in any way 
infringe the contributor’s freedom to discuss candidates and issues.  While contributions may result in 
political expression if spent by a candidate or an association to present views to the voters, the 
transformation of contributions into political debate involves speech by someone other than the 
contributor. 107
 
I must agree with Burger CJ who dissented from this view in Buckley, in invalidating 
both the donation limit and expenditure limit.  Too much should not be made of the 
distinction.  The donations are intended to be expended, and are expended, by the 
candidate in communicating a political view.  This communicated view is presumably 
broadly similar to the political view with which the donor agrees.  On one view, we 
should see the candidate as the medium through which the political views of his/her 
donors are communicated.  In my view, whether the donor speaks directly to the 
people, or indirectly through candidates he/she supports, both are political speech and 
should be entitled to the same protection.108   
 
One also wonders about the constitutional purpose behind the distinction – the effect 
of it is to allow limits on donations but not to limit total spend.  It is submitted that 
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effects/consequences are relevant considerations in considering the constitutionality 
of provisions and the acceptability of suggested distinctions.  This distinction is 
flawed because the effect of allowing limits on donations will, all other things being 
equal, end up limiting campaign expenditure.  This was exactly the thing the Supreme 
Court said was unacceptable.  It is true that limiting donations might cause candidates 
to cast the net further afield in terms of donations, but this is an option open to 
candidates whether or not limits exist, so I dismiss it as a ‘red herring’ in terms of 
justification of donation limits.109  I submit that, given the High Court’s acceptance 
that communication can be non-verbal, the political communication inherent in 
donating to a candidate or political party is just as valuable in terms of representative 
government as the ability of a candidate to spend money to communicate the political 
ideas and views of themselves, their party and those whom they represent. 
 
(4) Express Advocacy vs Issues-Based Discussion 
As discussed above, some of the American cases have drawn a distinction between 
these two kinds of speech, finding restrictions on the former more likely to be 
compatible with First Amendment rights than restrictions on the latter.  The Green 
Paper does not expressly refer to this distinction.110
 
I am not convinced that such a sharp distinction can or should be made between the 
two types of speech.  As some of the American cases have shown on their facts, it can 
be a very difficult line to draw.  Is an ad that advocates a particular view on a 
contentious topic, and then tells viewers to ‘contact candidates’ about it, or tells 
viewers what particular candidates think about the issue, in effect advocacy in favour 
of a particular candidate?  Or is it merely issue-based discussion?  What is the 
difference, in terms of freedoms, between expressly advocating for a candidate whose 
views one supports, and taking out an ad taking a position about an issue, and telling 
viewers/readers that a particular candidate also takes that position?  I would argue that 
the effect is virtually the same, and that we are resorting to unjustified distinctions to 
argue otherwise.   
 
If the distinction served some other purpose which was compatible with freedom of 
speech/freedom of political communication, the fact it sometimes required fine lines 
to be drawn might not be fatal.  But I am not convinced that express advocacy of a 
candidate is any less necessary to the kind of representative democracy we have, and 
wish to maintain, than issue-based advocacy.   
 
Conclusion 
I conclude that the introduction of electoral funding legislation would be a challenge 
for the Australian Government given the constitutional freedom of political 
communication that has been recognised by the High Court of Australia.  Although I 
cannot of course comment on any specific proposal as no bill has yet been drafted, the 
Court should start, when considering such a law, and the draftsperson should start, 
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when drafting such a law, with the general principle that it is fundamental in a 
democracy that people must have a right to debate issues, and that includes speech as 
well as hearing messages from others.  Of course, there must be a very strong and 
clear case for an interference with such a right.  It cannot be supported based on mere 
assertion or platitudes.  Some of the arguments given to support such regulation must 
be tested in terms of specific evidence.  There is evidence that the introduction of 
campaign finance regimes, such as in the United Kingdom, have not in fact achieved 
the purposes for which they were introduced.  Courts must be mindful of the fact that 
political parties may seek to change the funding rules to secure what they consider to 
be an electoral advantage to them.  A strong independent umpire must consider any 
such changes very carefully. 
 
The bill would need to explain cogently how the regulations it introduced represented 
the least drastic means to achieve a legitimate objective.  I have concluded that there 
is no justification for differential treatment of political donations on the one hand, and 
spending on the other.  Nor is the distinction between individual donors on the one 
hand and group donors on the other justified.  Nor is the distinction sometimes made 
between express advocacy and issues-based advocacy one that the bill should 
embrace.  The Australian Government must tread very carefully if it wishes to 
proceed on this path. 
